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INTRODUCTION
Not since George H.W. Bush banned it from the menu of Air
1
Force One did broccoli receive as much attention as during the legal
and political debate over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
2
Act (“ACA”). Opponents of the ACA have forcefully and repeatedly
argued that if Congress has the power to require Americans to purchase health insurance as a means of reducing health care costs, then
it likewise has the power to require Americans to eat broccoli. Broccoli is mentioned twelve times across the four Supreme Court opin3
ions issued in the ACA decision —that’s eleven more appearances
4
than it had made in all previous Supreme Court decisions combined.
As Judge Roger Vinson wrote in his district court opinion invalidating
the ACA’s minimum coverage provision, accepting the government’s
position meant that Congress “could require that people buy and
consume broccoli at regular intervals, not only because the required
purchases will positively impact interstate commerce, but also because people who eat healthier tend to be healthier, and are thus
5
more productive and put less of a strain on the health care system.”
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Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to symposium participants at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and to participants at the New York City Junior Faculty
Workshop for helpful suggestions. Daniel Bregman and Melissa Lerner provided excellent research assistance.
See Broccoli off Bush’s Table, CHIC. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1990, § 1, at 3.
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB]
(Roberts, C.J.) (mentioning broccoli three times); id. at 2619–20, 2624, 2625 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (five times); id. at 2650 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (four times).
The only other mention of broccoli in the U.S. Reports is buried within the transcript of
George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue, which was appended to Justice Stevens’ opinion in the Appendix to FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 752 (1978).
Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289 (N.D.
Fla. 2011).
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An obvious response to what Justice Ginsburg called “the broccoli
6
horrible” is that, presumptively, neither Congress nor any state may
7
require anyone to consume anything. Justice Frankfurter wrote for
the Supreme Court sixty years ago that forcible extraction of the contents of a criminal suspect’s stomach via an emetic solution “shocks
8
the conscience” and therefore violates the Due Process Clause. It
would seem to follow a fortiori that force-feeding broccoli to an otherwise sui juris person suspected of nothing but an aversion to eating
broccoli would also violate either the Fifth or the Fourteenth
Amendment, depending on whether the force-feeders were federal
or state officials. A reasonably competent 1L could recite the Socratic
dialogue that one would ordinarily expect to follow this observation:
it would explore the degree to which forcible purchase of health insurance is or is not like forcible consumption of food. The discourse
would, in other words, test the limits of substantive due process rather
than the limits of Article I.
And yet the legal and political discourse surrounding the ACA has
not taken this form. Litigation over the individual mandate focused
on the limits of congressional power embodied within Article I of the
Constitution, specifically the Commerce Clause9 and the General
Welfare Clause.10 Challengers to the mandate generally either avoided due process arguments entirely or gave them rote, superficial attention, and judges deciding the mandate cases followed suit. This
litigation choice would make sense if the Article I argument were obviously stronger than the due process argument. But that is not at all
obvious, or at least it was not obvious at the start of the litigation. As
Part I demonstrates, based on Supreme Court precedent at the time
of the ACA’s passage, the Article I argument bordered on frivolous
whereas the due process argument had, and still has, no “all-fours”
11
doctrinal obstacles.
6
7
8

9
10
11

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding a state-ordered compulsory
vaccination program).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing that “a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
It is useful to clarify the sense in which I believe the Commerce Clause argument was
“frivolous.” I do not mean to say that an attorney advancing such an argument risked
Rule 11 sanctions or even that any judge accepting such a claim, as five members of the
Supreme Court did, would be doing so ultra vires the Constitution. What I mean, rather,
is that the argument was in the nature of ipse dixit: a computer equipped with all of the
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Part II proposes and evaluates a competing set of broadly political
reasons for the nature of the discourse and, perhaps litigation choice
in these cases. Advancing a substantive due process argument would
have required opponents of the individual mandate and their financial sponsors to oppose the similar state-level mandate that Mitt
Romney signed into law as governor of Massachusetts. A strictly libertarian objection to the individual mandate would also have threatened to rend the fragile coalition between libertarians and social
conservatives that is essential to the vitality of the Tea Party and that
ties many Tea Party members to the Republican Party. Finally, and
relatedly, opponents of the mandate may have been reluctant to affiliate their arguments with the Court’s reproductive freedom precedents, as reliance on substantive due process would inevitably invite.
The most powerful argument against a health insurance purchasing
mandate is precisely the one the government conceded (indeed heralded) in defending the case: the mandate interferes with an individual’s personal “right to choose” how to allocate health care re12
sources.
An additional, non-exclusive set of reasons is neither political nor,
in a narrow sense, doctrinal, but relates to the sociology of American
constitutional argument. As Part III discusses, a substantive due process claim would have constituted an argument in favor of “econom13
ic” due process, a doctrine associated with Lochner v. New York and
considered verboten in the wake of the so-called New Deal settlement. The status of Lochner as an anticanonical case forecloses constitutional arguments well out of proportion to its doctrinal significance narrowly construed. Thus, even as the New Deal settlement is
said to condemn in equal measure limits on congressional power and
forms of economic due process, Lochner’s embodiment of the latter
contributes to what in practical terms is a much more profound repudiation.
Lochner, then, distorts constitutional argument by stopping economic due process in its tracks. It does so not because such arguments were more forcefully rejected in 1937 than Article I arguments

12

13

Supreme Court’s precedents and programmed to extrapolate reasonably from those
precedents to new sets of facts would have been quite unlikely to invalidate the individual
mandate as exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
Brief for Petitioners at 33, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 37168 (“As
Congress expressly found, the minimum coverage provision ‘regulates activity that is
commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and
when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.’”).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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14

grounded in cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart, but rather because the
Due Process Clause is and has been more contested and jurisgenerative than the Commerce Clause. Lochnerism was inaugurated because
of the fecundity of Lochner’s libertarianism, not the magnitude of its
doctrinal errors. Ironically, then, the cottage industry in Lochner revisionism derives from the same source as the juridical need to repudiate the decision.
I
As of March 2012, twenty-two federal court complaints had been
15
filed challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate. Of
14
15

247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Challenges to the Affordable Care Act are summarized at the ACA Litigation Blog. Brad
Joondeph, ACA LITIGATION BLOG, http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com (last visited July
20, 2012). The complaints in cases challenging the constitutionality of the individual
mandate are: First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Baldwin v.
Sebelius, No. 10-cv-1033 DMS (WMc) (S.D. Cal. 2012), 2012 WL 294466; Complaint Re
Section 1501, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Boyle v. Sebelius, No. CV1107868 GW (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012); Amended Complaint, Kinder v. Geithner,
No. 10-cv-00101-RWS (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011), 2011 WL 1576721; Second Amended Civil
Rights Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Coons v. Geithner, No. CV–10–
1714–PHX–GMS (D. Ariz. May 10, 2011), 2012 WL 3778219; Second Amended Petition
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Miss.
Mar. 4, 2011) (No. 2:10-cv-76); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. CIV11-030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2011); Second
Amended Complaint, Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv.-91-RV/EMT); Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Peterson v. Obama, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011)
(No. 10–CV–170–JL); Violation Title 28 U.S.C. §1331 & Civil Rights Request for Declaratory Judgment Trial by Jury, Purpura v. Sebelius, No. 1904814 (GEB) (D.N.J. 2011), 2011
WL 1547768; Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-cv-01065-DDD (N.D. Ohio 2011), 2011 WL 3200242; Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ass’n
of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Sebelius, No. 1:10-cv-0499-RJL (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2010);
Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, PeopleV.US v. Obama, No.
2:10-cv-01477-JCL-RJJ (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2010); Complaint, Calvey v. Obama, 792 F. Supp.
2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (No. CIV–10–353–R); Second Amended Complaint, Liberty
Univ. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010) (No. 6:10-cv-000-15-nkm); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 1:10-cv-01263-BAH (D.D.C. July 26, 2010); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011) (No.
1:10-cv-00950 (GK)); Class Action Petition for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Burlsworth v. Holder, No. 4:10-cv-00258-SWW (E.D. Ark. Apr. 27, 2010); Complaint, Fountain
Hills Tea Party Patriots, L.L.C. v. Sebelius, No. 2:10-cv-00893-DKD (D. Ariz. Apr. 22,
2010); Complaint, Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 811 F. Supp.
2d 1086 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (No. 1:10-cv-00763-CCCC); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Certification Pursuant to L. Civ. R. 11.2, New Jersey
Physicians Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d. 502 (D.N.J. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-01489(SDWMCA)); Complaint, Bellow v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10CV0165
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those twenty-two complaints, only eleven argued that the mandate to
purchase health insurance violated the Due Process Clause of the
16
Fifth Amendment. Only four of those eleven complaints alleged a
17
due process claim in the first four counts, and none alleged it as its
first argument. Just one district court opinion and no court of appeals opinions have addressed the merits of these substantive due
process claims. The one opinion to reach the argument rejected it as
foreclosed by Lochner and its progeny and the claim was subsequently
18
abandoned on appeal. By contrast, a majority of the Supreme Court

16

17

18

(E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2010), 2011 WL 2462205; Complaint, Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-11156-GCS-RSW); Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va.
2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH).
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 20, Baldwin v. Sebelius,
No. 10-cv-1033 DMS (WMc) (S.D. Cal. 2012), 2012 WL 294466; Complaint Re Section
1501, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at 91–94, Boyle v. Sebelius, No. CV1107868 GW (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012); Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 20, 22, Coons v. Geithner, No. CV–10–1714–PHX–
GMS (D. Ariz. May 10, 2011), 2012 WL 3778219; Amended Complaint at 46–55, Kinder v.
Geithner, No. 10-cv-00101-RWS (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011), 2011 WL 1576721; Second
Amended Petition for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 34–36, Bryant v. Holder, 809 F.
Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2011) (No. 2:10-cv-76); Second Amended Complaint,
Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D.
Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv.-91-RV/EMT); Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 19–20, U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-cv-01065-DDD (N.D.
Ohio 2011), 2011 WL 3200242; Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at 43, PeopleV.US v. Obama, No. 2:10-cv-01477-JCL-RJJ (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2010);
Complaint at 24, Calvey v. Obama, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (No. CIV–10–
353–R); Amended Complaint at 24, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Certification Pursuant to L. Civ. R. 11.2 at 9, New Jersey Physicians Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d. 502 (D.N.J. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-01489(SDWMCA)); Complaint at 14, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D.
Mich. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-11156-GCS-RSW).
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 20, Baldwin v. Sebelius,
No. 10-cv-1033 DMS (WMc) (S.D. Cal. 2012), 2012 WL 294466; Second Amended Petition
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 24, 36, Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2011) (No. 2:10-cv-76); Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief at 19–20, U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-cv-01065-DDD
(N.D. Ohio 2011), 2011 WL 3200242; Amended Complaint at 24, Florida ex rel McCollum
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010); First
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Certification Pursuant to
L. Civ. R. 11.2 at 9, New Jersey Physicians Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d. 502 (D.N.J.
2010) (No. 2:10-cv-01489(SDW-MCA)).
See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011); Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648
F.3d 1235, 1291 n.93 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that the due process ruling was not appealed).
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agreed that the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s power un19
der the Commerce Clause.
In light of these outcomes, there is every reason to believe that focusing on federal constitutional limits internal rather than external
to the Commerce Clause was correct as a matter of litigation strategy.
This Article does not challenge whether that strategy was correct but
20
seeks to explore why it was correct. The doctrinal obstacles to invalidation of the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause are
well stated in Justice Ginsburg’s partial dissent and we need not long
linger on the case here. In brief, Congress validly legislates pursuant
to the Commerce Clause when it regulates the channels of commerce, the instrumentalities of commerce, or economic activities hav21
ing substantial effects on interstate commerce. Congress may also
target non-economic activity that it reasonably believes must be regulated in order to ensure the effectiveness of a broader regulatory
22
scheme that substantially affects interstate commerce.
The ACA regulates activities having substantial effects on interstate commerce in at least two ways. First, and most directly, it regulates the decision to self-insure rather than to purchase health insurance on the open market.
Because medical expenses are
unpredictable, many who choose to self-insure cannot ultimately afford to do so. Extant legal and social norms require that emergency
medical care be provided to individuals regardless of ability to pay,
and the cost of providing that care is passed on in the form of higher
23
premiums to those who pay for health insurance. Individuals who
self-insure are also substantially less likely to seek preventive care, and
24
so when they do receive care it is disproportionately costly.
No one in the litigation before the Supreme Court denied that
self-insurance has substantial effects on interstate commerce. The
crux of the challengers’ argument, rather, was that self-insurance is
19
20

21
22
23
24

See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.).
Nor have I any quarrel, as a general matter, with legal advocates advancing novel constitutional arguments. It does seem to be incumbent upon the Supreme Court to exercise
caution in adopting such arguments, particularly when reviewing landmark congressional
statutes drafted, debated, and passed in reliance on a well-settled legal framework. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“When the political branches of the
Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution
already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.”).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005).
Id. at 18–19.
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 2612.
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25

not economic activity. If that claim does not carry its own refutation, one need look no further than the Court’s decision in Wickard v.
26
Filburn, in which a farmer’s decision not to enter the wheat market
was validly subject to regulation on the ground that his decision, aggregated with others similarly situated, substantially affected the price
27
of wheat. Or to the Court’s more recent decision in Gonzales v.
Raich, in which a marijuana grower’s decision not to enter the commercial marketplace did not exempt her from the reach of federal
criminal laws justified under the commerce power precisely because
“leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control
28
would . . . affect price and market conditions.”
29
30
Neither United States v. Lopez nor United States v. Morrison, the
two Rehnquist Court precedents imposing internal constitutional limitations on the reach of the Commerce Clause, implicates any of the
above reasoning. The Gun Free School Zones Act, which was invalidated in Lopez, sought to regulate possession of a gun near a school,
which is neither an economic activity itself nor an essential compo31
nent of any existing and constitutionally valid regulatory program.
The federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence that
the Court struck down in Morrison did not itself target economic activity and was not connected in any direct way to regulation of a com32
mercial market. One need not repudiate either case in order to believe that Congress was on firm constitutional ground in including an
individual mandate as part of the ACA; it is therefore simply untrue
33
that this particular rationale presumes unlimited federal power.
There is a second, independent way in which the ACA may (indeed, must) be described as a regulation of activity with substantial
effects on interstate commerce. The Act is designed, among other
things, to prevent insurance carriers from discriminating on the basis
of preexisting medical conditions to a degree that makes the pur25
26
27
28

29
30
31
32
33

See Brief for Private Respondents on the Individual Mandate at 7–9, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (No. 11-398).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Id. at 127–28.
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964) (holding that, acting through its commerce powers, Congress could require restaurants to serve black customers).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
For a concise summary of Lopez, see Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549).
For a concise summary of Morrison, see id. at 25 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. 598).
See Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits That the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27
CONST. COMM. 591, 598 (2011) (“[U]pholding the minimum coverage provision would
not authorize Congress to impose mandates that regulate noneconomic subject matter.”).
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34

chase of insurance cost-prohibitive. It is, in this sense, a regulation
of the market for health insurance. Again, no one in the litigation
before the Supreme Court denied, nor could plausibly deny, that an
insurer’s refusing coverage or raising prices on the basis of preexisting conditions is an economic activity substantially affecting interstate
35
commerce. The individual mandate is included within the statute
because it is financially infeasible to restrict preexisting condition discrimination without substantially broadening the pool of the insured
to include people who are unlikely to become extremely sick in the
36
near future. From this perspective, the individual mandate is justified as a means of making Congress’s concededly valid regulatory
scheme effective.
McCulloch v. Maryland announces the rule governing the scope of
Congress’s choice of means to effect its constitutionally valid ends:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
37
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” The Court reiterated
38
in a much more recent case, United States v. Comstock, that Congress
may choose any means “that [are] rationally related to the implemen39
tation of a constitutionally enumerated power.” Comstock upheld the
authority of the federal government to confine federal inmates classified as mentally ill and “sexually dangerous” beyond their terms of
imprisonment where their state of domicile or trial refuses to assume
40
custody. The Court upheld this practice on the grounds that confinement of such persons helps to ensure the safety of communities
surrounding prisons, which are themselves rationally related to the
existence of federal crimes, which are themselves rationally related to
various substantive enumerated regulatory powers (including the
41
power to regulate interstate commerce). The link between the individual mandate and the regulation of preexisting condition discrimi-

34
35

36
37
38
39
40
41

42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a) (Supp. IV 2011) (prohibiting discriminatory health insurance premium rates).
See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 539–40 (1944) (“The modern
insurance business . . . has become one of the largest and most important branches of
commerce.” (internal footnote omitted)).
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2613–15 (U.S. June 28, 2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
Id. at 1956.
Id. at 1954–55.
Id. at 1958.
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nation in the health insurance industry is much shorter and much
tighter than the link upheld in Comstock eight weeks after the ACA
was signed into law.
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause is not
unlimited, of course, and it is the absence of obvious limits that ani42
mates much of the ACA litigation. But Comstock addressed this objection by referring to the limits embedded within substantive enu43
merated powers and within other provisions of the Constitution.
The reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause itself is left “primari44
ly . . . to the judgment of Congress,” and certainly does not preclude
federal regulation of a decision not to do something. Consider, for
example, the decision not to file a tax return, or not to register for
45
Selective Service, or not to report for federal jury duty. And so the
42

43
44
45

A brief additional word on broccoli and related objections is irresistible. The most powerful “limiting principle” that prevents a federal broccoli mandate is neither any specific
legal doctrinal principle nor the principle of political accountability as such. Cf. Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (describing the strong
role of states in American federalism as important safeguards against overbearing Congressional power). It is more precisely what we might call a principle of social membership. It is not that any member of Congress supporting a broccoli mandate would be voted out of office—this kind of political accountability story is premised, implicitly, on the
vaguely conspiratorial notion that members of Congress would enact tyrannical regulations (for their own sake?) if left unchecked by their constituents. The more direct explanation for members of Congress not seeking to enact tyrannical regulations is that
they do not support them. A society in which the broccoli objection counts as a slippery
slope argument is one whose elected officials are quite unlikely to support a broccoli
mandate. It follows that we cannot actually count on such officials being voted out of office for supporting the mandate because the society in which such support was possible
would not find the mandate self-evidently unacceptable.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956–57.
Id. at 1957 (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934)).
One distinction between failing to file a tax return and failing to purchase health insurance is that the former is regulated only if the person engages in certain prerequisite activities, namely earning a specified amount of income, whereas under the ACA the latter
is not (or so some have claimed). There are a number of responses to this objection.
First, the ACA penalty does not in fact apply to everyone who fails to purchase health insurance, only those “applicable individuals” who meet certain income requirements and
are not otherwise exempt, for example, for religious reasons. See generally 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A(d) (2006). Second, it is not at all clear why either the Necessary and Proper
Clause or the Sixteenth Amendment would prevent the government from requiring all
Americans to file a tax return regardless of whether they earned any income. Third, even
if either of the first two responses were unavailing, it is difficult to imagine why constitutional significance should attach to the distinction between requiring someone to do
something by virtue of being human and requiring her to do it only if she earns income
or engages in some other activity essential to one’s livelihood. It is true that the Constitution imposes certain requirements on “direct” taxes, namely that they be proportionate to
state population. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 4. But given that the ACA penalty does not
apply to people who have health insurance, it is plainly not a capitation tax, property tax,
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Necessary and Proper Clause inquiry either returns us to the Commerce Clause itself or refers us to independent constitutional limitations on congressional power, two of which I discuss below. Note,
though, that when we frame the internal Commerce Clause inquiry
in terms of regulating preexisting condition discrimination, the concern over regulation of inactivity disappears, because it is indisputable that pricing health insurance policies is an economic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.
The doctrinal explanations just described, in addition to others I
46
have reserved, led several prominent constitutional scholars to conclude that the challengers’ Article I arguments were frivolous. Akhil
Reed Amar compared Judge Vinson’s opinion invalidating the indi47
vidual mandate to Roger Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.
Andrew Koppelman described the arguments for the constitutionality
of the individual mandate as “obvious” and the objections as “silly,”
writing that “no one had heard of [the action/inaction distinction]
48
until the mandate’s opponents invented it.” Charles Fried called
the notion that Congress is impermissibly forcing people into the
health insurance market “a canard that’s been invented by the tea
party and Randy Barnetts of the world,” adding that he was “astonished to hear it coming out of the mouths of the people on [the Su49
preme Court].”

46

47
48
49

or anything else that could reasonably fit the definition of a direct tax. See NFIB, 132 S.
Ct. 2566, 2598–99 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.). Fourth, even if that response were not sufficient, because virtually all people must at some point finance the costs of medical care,
and because those costs are radically unpredictable, the market for health insurance is
quite unlike most other markets, and so may easily justify sui generis regulatory strategies.
Finally, the distinction does not apply to the failure to register for Selective Service or to
report for jury duty, regulatory requirements that are also justified, if at all, under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
As the Court held, Congress’s taxing power is sufficient to justify the individual mandate,
which is enforced solely by the Internal Revenue Service and whose provisions are contained within the Internal Revenue Code. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (Roberts, C.J.).
The taxing power argument was well-regarded by many in the scholarly community
throughout the litigation, see, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 2–6, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 135050, but it was not a significant focus of public debate
over the individual mandate until the Court’s decision issued.
Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Showdown: A Florida Judge Distorted the Law in Striking Down
Healthcare Reform, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at A25.
Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care
Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 2, 3, 20 n.93 (2011).
Ezra Klein & Charles Fried, Reagan’s solicitor general: ‘Health care is interstate commerce. Is
this a regulation of it? Yes. End of story.’, WONKBLOG (WASH. POST) (Mar. 28, 2012, 1:09
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/reagans-solicitor-general-
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So much for the constitutional objections to the individual mandate that are native to the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and
Proper Clause. The challengers might yet have a case grounded in
limitations external to Article I. One possible restriction on congressional power to require Americans to purchase health insurance
might be the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment has historically been invoked to support the existence of residual sovereign
50
power retained by state governments. Thus, the Court discussed the
Tenth Amendment in holding that the federal government may not
require state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks
on purchasers of handguns under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act even if it could do so itself or could require private gun
51
dealers to do so. The text of the Tenth Amendment is not, however,
limited to protecting state prerogatives. It reads: “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
52
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
Challengers to the ACA relied on this language to argue that, just as
the right to control the actions of state police officers is inherent in
state sovereignty, an individual’s capacity over health care financing is
inherent in individual autonomy and cannot be infringed by the fed-

50

51
52

health-care-is-interstate-commerce-is-this-a-regulation-of-it-yes-end-of-story/2011/08/
25/gIQAmaQigS_blog.
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–14 (1999) (referring to the Tenth Amendment to
“confirm” the residual sovereign immunity of states); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 935–36 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that an act requiring state officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers “violates the
Tenth Amendment”); id. at 936 (Thomas, J., concurring) (writing separately to emphasize that the Tenth Amendment “affirms” that the federal government has limited powers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155–57 (1992) (explaining that, in cases
implicating vertical separation of powers, the inquiries into the scope of enumerated
power and the reserved province of state sovereignty “are mirror images of each other”);
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842–44 (1976) (discussing the Tenth
Amendment as an affirmation of limits on federal authority to regulate in certain core areas of state sovereign authority), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273–74 (1918) (“The
grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not intended to destroy the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution.”), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941). See generally U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848–57 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(elaborating the position that the Tenth Amendment protects powers reserved to the
people as assembled in states).
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20.
U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
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eral government even acting pursuant to otherwise legitimate author53
ity.
54
Let us assume for the sake of argument (and only for its sake)
that “the people” as used in the Tenth Amendment refers to individuals rather than a broader body politic. On that assumption, which is
required to make sense of the claim, the presence of this novel argument in the ACA litigation makes even more urgent the question animating this article. We have a name for powers reserved to individuals and not delegated to government: they’re called rights, and the
Constitution has a great deal to say about them. But rather than argue in a straightforward way that the individual mandate infringes
upon rights protected by the Fifth Amendment or some other obviously rights-sensitive constitutional provision, challengers to the
mandate have embedded their rights claims in roundabout arguments about federalism. At the start of the litigation, there was no
case holding, even remotely, that either the constitutional structure
or the Tenth Amendment itself prevents the federal government
from conscripting individuals into acting against their will to accom55
plish some federal regulatory objective. It makes sense that this
would be so given that the Court’s rights jurisprudence is substantial
and available to serve arguments of just this sort. If someone has no
right against compelled purchase of health insurance, it is difficult to
understand why the federal government may not compel that pur56
chase when acting pursuant to otherwise legitimate powers.
Challenging the individual mandate primarily on federalism
grounds would yet make strategic sense if it were abundantly clear
that there is indeed no constitutional right against compelled purchase of health insurance. I am not inclined to argue, doctrinally or
otherwise, for the existence of such a right, but unlike with the Article I argument discussed above, precedent at the start of litigation did
not foreclose the possibility. Let us begin, as we must, with Lochner.
Judge Vinson dismissed the substantive due process claim by refer53
54

55

56

See Brief for Private Respondents on the Individual Mandate, at 46–49, NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV.
801, 825 (2008) (“Prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the term ‘the people’ referred to the collective sovereign entity of the citizens of a given state.”).
Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 (“‘[T]he Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers
upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.’” (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992))).
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (“[The Commerce] power, like all others
vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”).
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ring to the Lochner era: “[T]his claim would have found Constitutional support in the Supreme Court’s decisions in the years prior to
the New Deal legislation of the mid-1930’s, when the Due Process
57
Clause was interpreted to reach economic rights and liberties.” According to Judge Vinson, the right claimed by the challengers was a
form of economic substantive due process, which the rejection of
Lochner forecloses.
A puzzle arises immediately. In rejecting the due process claim,
Judge Vinson cited an Eleventh Circuit decision stating that “[a]
searching inquiry into the validity of legislative judgments concerning
58
economic regulation is not required.” That is, the substantive due
process claim failed because the legislative scheme counted as economic regulation, but the Commerce Clause claim succeeded because it did not count as economic regulation. One gets the distinct
impression that either a bad argument was disguised as a good one or
vice versa.
Anyone making an argument that may reasonably be styled as
economic substantive due process is certainly on rough constitutional
terrain. But government regulation of economic transactions is not,
ipso facto, immune from substantive due process attack. The Supreme Court held in Carey v. Population Services International that the
State of New York could not restrict the retail distribution of contra59
ceptives to sales by licensed pharmacists. The Court applied strict
scrutiny to the regulation, because “the same test must be applied to
state regulations that burden an individual’s right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state
60
statutes that prohibit the decision entirely.” The lesson of the case,
61
62
consistent with Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny, is that restrictions
on financial activity cannot be evaluated in a vacuum but must be
considered in light of the interests to which the activity is instrumental. The State presumptively may not burden fundamental rights,
and burdens occasioned by commercial regulation are no exception.

57
58
59
60
61
62

Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1161 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
Id. (quoting TRM, Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 941, 945 (11th Cir. 1995)).
431 U.S. 678, 700–02 (1977).
Id. at 688.
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating restrictions on political campaign expenditures).
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (invalidating a
prohibition on certain election expenditures by corporations and unions funded out of
general treasury funds).

278

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:1

The appropriate framing question is not, then, whether the government is regulating an economic transaction, but whether, in doing so, the government is infringing upon a fundamental right.
Whether or not individuals have a fundamental right to self-insure for
health care cannot be answered by staring harder at the text of Lochner. A sympathetic rendering of the ACA claim would compare it to
the case in which, rather than restricting the ability of bakers to contract to work more than sixty hours per week, the New York legislature had instead restricted the ability of bakers to contract to work
fewer than sixty hours a week. Putting aside Thirteenth Amendment
concerns, Lochner is surely not sufficient to reject a substantive due
process challenge to such a law.
63
A far more germane precedent is Jacobson v. Massachusetts, decided three days before Lochner was argued. The Jacobson Court upheld a
compulsory smallpox vaccination program in Massachusetts against a
64
due process challenge. If the government may, consistent with the
Due Process Clause, require its citizens to take a potentially dangerous vaccine (in the Lochner era, no less!), then may it not a fortiori
65
require its solvent citizens to purchase health insurance? Not necessarily. First, the state interest in a mandatory vaccination program for
a deadly and contagious illness might reasonably (though not inevitably) be described as more compelling than the interest in preventing either pre-existing condition discrimination by insurers or freeriding and cost-shifting by health care consumers. Second, Jacobson
indeed precedes the effective rejection of Lochner in West Coast Hotel
66
Co. v. Parrish, but it also precedes the revitalization of substantive
67
due process in Griswold v. Connecticut. And Griswold and its progeny
are concerned precisely with an individual’s autonomy over private
decision-making. Under the modern Due Process Clause, a woman
has a presumptive constitutional right to determine whether to bear
68
69
or beget a child, an individual has both the right to bodily integrity
70
and the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and even a
prisoner has a “significant liberty interest” in not being administered

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Id. at 39.
See Koppelman, supra note 48, at 22–23.
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952).
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
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71

antipsychotic drugs against his will. A panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that this
line of cases supported a constitutionally protected right to receive
72
potentially life-saving experimental drugs.
This series of cases has led Abigail Moncrieff to identify a constitutional “freedom of health” that includes “a freedom to reject unwanted medical care and implicitly . . . a freedom to obtain at least certain
73
kinds of medical care.” If such a liberty interest indeed exists and is
sufficient to warrant heightened constitutional scrutiny, then the argument that the government may not compel the purchase of health
insurance becomes more colorable. Moncrieff argues that the individual mandate raised constitutional questions because it effectively
required consumers to pay for care through a system that interposes a
third-party auditor between the individual and her physician’s health
74
care choices. More broadly, a right to direct one’s own medical care
might reasonably be threatened by a system that requires limited
funds to be spent on health insurance rather than saved for future
care insofar as it uses (commandeers?) the consumer’s own finances
to alter the costs and benefits of particular care options. Routine and
preventive care, rationally avoided in the absence of the mandate, is
75
made a moral hazard under the ACA.
Moncrieff ultimately concludes that to the extent there is a presumptive constitutional objection to the individual mandate grounded in the freedom of health, the presumption of unconstitutionality
is overcome by a sufficiently compelling governmental interest and
76
the narrow tailoring of the individual mandate’s remedial scheme. I
agree, and I am less certain than Moncrieff that the most reasonable
interpretation of the Court’s cases supports a broad “freedom of
health.” The important point, however, is not whether I believe the
substantive due process argument is a loser, but why virtually everyone of consequence in the massive litigation over the ACA appeared
to hold the same view, even as many of those same people were un71
72
73
74
75

76

See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990).
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d
470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2237 (2011).
See id. at 2249–50.
See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979) (identifying
the moral hazard created by the presence of insurance and proposing a formal model
evaluating mitigation strategies); cf. Moncrieff, supra note 73, at 2248 (noting that the
ACA’s mandate is not satisfied by “the most freedom-preserving” forms of insurance coverage such as high-deductible sickness and accident insurance).
See Moncrieff, supra note 73, at 2250–51.
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moved by seemingly persuasive defenses of congressional power under Article I.
In different terms, we may identify the litigation choices in this
case, and the judicial responses to those choices, as emblematic of an
aggressive, but distinctly partial, unsettling of the New Deal settlement. As Larry Kramer writes, the New Deal settlement entailed “the
Court restor[ing] to politics questions respecting the definition or
scope of the powers delegated by the Constitution to Congress and
77
the Executive, subject only to a very limited rational basis scrutiny.”
78
As indicated by Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products, it
also entailed “more exacting judicial scrutiny” for certain individual
79
rights but not for others, namely those represented by Lochner and
80
falling generally under the category of economic and social rights.
The ACA litigation placed the twin pillars of the New Deal settlement
in sharp relief, and pulled them apart. Under the settlement, both
the Article I and the substantive due process claims against the individual mandate should have been off limits. In reality, only one was.
II
It is possible to tell a reasonably powerful but wholly extralegal
story about the paucity of substantive due process claims in this litigation and in its surrounding discourse. Like many good stories, it begins where the money trail ends.
Consider the following. The litigation immediately before the
81
Court in the ACA litigation was brought by twenty-six states, two private plaintiffs, and the National Federation of Independent Business
(“NFIB”). The NFIB is a business lobbying organization funded in
part by the Claude R. Lambe Charitable Foundation, which is con-

77
78
79
80

81

Larry D. Kramer, Foreword, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 122 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Id.
See id. at 152; see also Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 686 (2005) (discussing the Lochner narrative in
which "the New Deal revolution produced a new breed of Justices who believed in judicial
restraint and appropriate respect for democratic processes in ordinary social and economic regulation"); Kramer, supra note 77, at 121 (explaining that, under the New Deal
settlement, the Court "reserved room for 'a more exacting judicial inquiry' to protect a
broad category of individual rights, including those specified in or inferred from the Bill
of Rights and Reconstruction Amendments; those pertaining to voting and the political
process; and those necessary to protect racial, religious, or other 'discrete and insular minorities.'").
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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82

trolled by Charles G. Koch. Koch’s brother David endorsed Mitt
Romney for President in 2008 and hosted a major fundraiser in the
83
Hamptons for Romney in 2010. The Kochs’ brother Bill and his
coal company, Oxbow Carbon, donated $1 million to Romney’s Su84
per PAC, Restore Our Future, in 2011. David Koch is a co-founder
of and has donated more than $1 million to Americans for Prosperity, among the most significant financial and logistical backers of the
85
Tea Party movement. All of the plaintiffs, including the states, were
86
represented by David Rivkin and Lee Casey of BakerHostetler. Rivkin and Casey were legal advisors to Romney on his justice advisory
committee throughout the primary season and, as of this writing, remain two of his most high-profile supporters within the legal com87
munity.
In other words, the litigation against the ACA has been funded
and directed in significant part by a network of elite Republicans
committed to Mitt Romney’s presidential aspirations and to the sustenance of the Tea Party movement. If the individual mandate violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause then it also violates
88
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. A successful substantive due process argument against the individual mandate would
therefore mean that the only other American executive to sign such a
mandate into law, Mitt Romney, would have supported equally unconstitutional health care legislation. Significant litigation backed by
82

83

84
85

86
87

88

See Robert Greenwald & Jesse Lava, Koch Brothers v. Health Reform, OPEN SALON (Mar. 26,
2010, 3:41 PM), http://open.salon.com/blog/robert_greenwald/2012/03/26/ koch_bro
thers_v_health_reform.
See Ari Berman, Romney’s Koch Brothers Connections, NATION (Feb. 24, 2012, 12:56 PM),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/166447/romneys-koch-brothers-connections; Maggie
Haberman & Kenneth P. Vogel, GOP mega-donors look toward 2012, POLITICO.COM (Oct.
23, 2010, 5:33 PM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=DAEF889F-ABE91FE58FF12C47CE0C5A7.
See Ian Duncan & Matea Gold, Romney Backers Test a Ban on Donors, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2012, at A1, A7.
See Jane Mayer, Covert Operations: The Billionaire Brothers Who Are Waging a War Against
Obama, NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2010, at 44, 46, available at http://www.newyorker.com/rep
orting/2010/08/30/100830fa_fact_mayer?printable=true; Laurie Bennett, Tracking Koch
Money and Americans for Prosperity, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2012, 10:35 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lauriebennett/2012/03/31/tracking-koch-money-andamericans-for-prosperity/.
Amended Complaint at 33, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
See Ashley Killough, Bork to co-chair Romney justice committee, CNN.COM (Aug. 2, 2011, 12:12
PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/02/bork-to-co-chair-romney-justicecommittee.
See generally Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408 (2010).
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establishment Republicans and premised on the unconstitutionality
of Romney’s signature legislative achievement would have been deeply threatening to Romney’s Republican primary prospects and, therefore, to the possibility of a Republican victory in the 2012 presidential
election. Threading the federalism needle would be a rational strategy for anyone with this suggested set of priorities.
Quite apart from Romney’s presidential prospects, the link between the Tea Party movement and the Republican Party, so vital to
Republican political energy in 2010 and since, has depended on
tempering the Tea Party’s fundamentalist libertarian elements and
supporting its anti-Washington impulses.
As has been well89
documented, the modern Republican Party comprises a tenuous coalition of economic and social conservatives, a partial result of Wil90
liam F. Buckley’s and Frank Meyer’s famous “fusion” strategy. Libertarianism that takes the form of anti-regulatory zeal directed at
Congress is harmonious with that fusion, whereas a purer form of anti-statist libertarianism is threatening to it. Tea Party supporters appear to be divided between libertarians on one hand and fiscal and
social conservatives on the other. Based on extensive survey research
conducted during the fall of 2010, Emily Ekins concludes that “[t]he
Tea Party seems unified on role of government questions regarding
economics and business; however, they are roughly split in half about
91
the government promoting a particular set of values.” Libertarians
within the Tea Party align with Democrats on social and cultural is92
sues but align with Republicans on economic issues. Conservatives
93
within the Tea Party align with Republicans on both sets of issues.
Challenging the ACA as an overreach by Washington can be supported not only by establishment Republicans but also by both wings of
the Tea Party, whereas challenging the ACA as more generally statist
threatens to split significant elements of the Tea Party from the Republican mainstream.

89
90

91

92
93

See GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE
1945, at 235 (Intercollegiate Studies Inst. 1996) (1976).
See John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, THE RIGHT NATION: CONSERVATIVE POWER
IN AMERICA 51 (2004); Kevin Smant, PRINCIPLES AND HERESIES: FRANK S. MEYER AND THE
SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 49–52 (2002).
Emily McClintock Ekins, The Character and Economic Morality of the Tea Party Movement, 1, 27 (Sept. 5, 2011) (unnumbered working paper presented at the 2011 American
Political Science Association Annual Meeting, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1902394).
Id. at 23–24.
Id.
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Relatedly, the unity of the Republican coalition requires official
opposition to abortion rights. Pro-abortion rights Republican politi94
cians, once common, are nearly extinct, and hostility to Roe v. Wade
remains the most significant, if at times sub rosa, litmus test for Republican judges. An integrated political and legal strategy for overturning the ACA must, like any strategy that relies on mass conservative mobilization, be compatible with Roe’s incorrectness. But it is
difficult to conceive of a competent legal brief advocating invalidation of the individual mandate on due process grounds that does not
95
rely on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which
96
affirmed the “essential holding” of Roe. The controlling joint opinion in Casey states that “[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that there
97
is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter”
and that “[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela98
tionships, child rearing, and education.”
The freedom to make
healthcare decisions arguably falls within the carapace that these various decisional rights erect, and indeed the individual mandate requires consumers to purchase insurance plans that provide coverage
99
for “maternity and newborn care” and “pediatric services.”
The
mandate therefore affects an individual’s allocation of financial resources to competing health care options; that allocation decision is
plausibly covered by the liberty interests articulated in Casey. That
language from Casey, moreover, was co-authored by Justice Kennedy,
who most observers assumed would be a significant swing vote in the
ACA litigation. To rely on a substantive due process argument but to
eschew reliance on the Court’s controlling abortion decision would
border on legal malpractice.
To be clear, none of the above is offered as either psychoanalysis
or investigative journalism. I have no special insight into the actual
reasons that motivated the choice to rely on federalism arguments
and not to rely on substantive due process. It may suffice as explanation to note that the choice was likely correct strategically, on which I
have more to say in Part III. And even if the lawyers, funders, and clients making that choice were motivated by the kinds of political con-

94
95
96
97
98
99

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 846.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 851.
Patient Protection and Affordable
§ 18022(b)(1)(A)–(J) (Supp. IV 2011).

Care

Act

§ 1302(b)(1)(A)–(J),

42

U.S.C.
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siderations I have discussed, cognitive dissonance may well have led
them to experience their decision-making process as free from such
influences. At a minimum, however, this Part demonstrates that, in
the context of the ACA litigation, there were substantial political obstacles to reliance on substantive due process. Whatever the doctrinal
benefits of doing so might have been, the strategic costs were likely
much higher.
III
The story Part II tells remains incomplete. It gestures suggestively
a partial explanation for the litigation choices of some prominent
challengers to the individual mandate, but it does not explain the responses of judges to the substantive due process claims that have in
fact been made. As discussed above, Judge Vinson ruled that the individual mandate was unconstitutional but was quite skeptical of the
substantive due process argument. Judge Sutton referred to the due
process version of the plaintiff’s argument in the individual mandate
challenge rejected by the Sixth Circuit:
Why construe the Constitution . . . to place this limitation—that citizens
cannot be forced to buy insurance, vegetables, cars and so on—solely in a
grant of power to Congress, as opposed to due process limitations on
power with respect to all American legislative bodies? Few doubt that the
States may require individuals to buy medical insurance, and indeed at
least two of them have. The same goes for a related and familiar mandate of the States—that most adults must purchase car insurance. Yet no
court has invalidated these kinds of mandates under the Due Process
Clause or any other liberty-based guarantee of the Constitution. That
means one of two things: either compelled purchases of medical insurance are different from compelled purchases of other goods and services,
or the States, even under plaintiffs’ theory of the case, may compel purchases of insurance, vegetables, cars and so on. Sometimes an intuition is
100
just an intuition.

Judge Sutton treats the absence of successful due process claims
against the individual mandate as evidence that such claims are inadequate. It may well be that judges who have rejected the substantive
due process argument have been socialized into a political culture
that prioritizes limits on federal power over aggrandizement of individual rights. That argument, however, is speculative, vaguely paranoid, and happily unnecessary. The better view links the doctrinal
account of Part I with the socio-political account of Part II to arrive at

100

Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 565 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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a more complete picture of the legal status of economic due process
arguments. In brief, Lochner’s status as an anticanonical case, which
results in large measure from its compatibility with other rights-based
claims, distorts doctrinal arguments about economic rights.
101
Lochner is the dean of the anticanon. No case is more consistent102
ly labeled anticanonical by academics; no repudiated case more
consistently receives significant treatment in leading constitutional
103
law casebooks; and no case is negatively cited more frequently in
104
As David Strauss writes, “[y]ou
modern Supreme Court opinions.
have to reject Lochner if you want to be in the mainstream of Ameri105
can constitutional law today.”
A judicial decision does not acquire this unhappy status by happenstance or even through the ordinary operation of the common
law. Within the U.S. constitutional tradition, the few cases that become strongly anticanonical are the detritus of regimes that succumbed to constitutional revolutions. The Civil War and Reconstruction represent the repudiation of Dred Scott v. Sandford; the New Deal
settlement represents the repudiation of Lochner; and the Second Re106
construction represents the repudiation of Plessy v. Ferguson.
One
of the functions of anticanonical discourse is to reconcile constitutional continuity with the rejection of the traditions these cases represent. We persuade ourselves that these cases were wrong the day they
were decided so that we may assure ourselves that we are not as one
107
with a people committed to slavery, to sweatshops, and to Jim Crow.
Under the circumstances, it is not enough for someone arguing in
favor of a form of economic due process to dance around the unyielding Lochner precedent. She must confront it directly, proactively,
and successfully. The oral argument in Florida v. Department of Health
and Human Services was devoted largely to articulating and debating a
limiting principle to the federal government’s assertion of regulatory
108
power under the Commerce Clause. Had the litigation instead focused on substantive due process, the argument (in the unlikely
event it made it to the Supreme Court) would instead have focused
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

See generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011) (discussing the
role of Lochner and other cases that stand as exemplars of constitutional law gone wrong).
Id. at 391.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 398.
David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003).
Greene, supra note 101, at 468.
See Balkin, supra note 80, at 709–10.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–18, 23, 27–31, 39–45, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591
(2012) (No. 11-398).
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on how the challengers’ claims differed from the claims accepted in
Lochner. In fact, Lochner made several appearances at the Supreme
Court oral argument even without any due process claim to speak of.
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli argued that “to embark on the kind
of analysis that [the challengers] suggest the Court ought to embark
109
on is to import Lochner-style substantive due process.” Later in the
argument, Chief Justice Roberts said that “it would be going back to
Lochner if we were put in the position of saying, no, you can use your
commerce power to regulate insurance, but you can’t use your com110
merce power to regulate this market in other ways.” And Justice Sotomayor asked Paul Clement, arguing on behalf of the respondents,
“Is this a Lochner era argument that only the States can [require the
111
purchase of insurance], even though it affects commerce?”
Notice that each invocation of Lochner associated the case with a
different substantive proposition. The first tied Lochner to the notion
that unenumerated liberty interests limit governmental regulatory
power; the second to the notion that courts should import “nested
oppositions” such as activity/inactivity or direct/indirect into judicial
112
review of federal power; the third to the notion that the Tenth
Amendment or its equivalent acts as an independent limitation on
otherwise valid exercises of federal authority. None of these propositions needs to be linked to Lochner, and indeed the latter two align
113
more closely with cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart and Carter v. Carter
114
Coal Co., which invalidated federal statutes. Moreover, notwithstanding their association with Lochner, none of the three propositions is fully discredited. All of modern substantive due process jurisprudence involves limitations that unenumerated liberty interests
place on regulatory power; the nested opposition of economic/noneconomic is a fixture of modern Commerce Clause case law;
115
116
and New York v. United States and Printz v. United States are difficult
to understand in the absence of an external limit on congressional
power grounded in federalism concerns.
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See Jack M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1669 (1990) (reviewing JOHN M.
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521 U.S. 898 (1997).

Oct. 2012]

WHAT THE NEW DEAL SETTLED

287

Lochner, then, is the hardest-working case in the U.S. Reports. It is
both a synecdoche and a rhetorical resource. Its unquestionably
negative valence enables it to stand in for—and thereby to attack—a
very broad set of propositions, even some that, in other contexts, are
embedded within our constitutional tradition. One such proposition
is economic due process. Even if we can rather easily distinguish
statutory invalidation of a labor contract from statutory compulsion
to enter into an insurance contract, Lochner casts a shadow—a penumbra, if you will—over the entire enterprise. It forces recalculation of the anticipated costs and benefits of advancing certain kinds
of claims and therefore may strongly distort doctrinal argument.
Like an athletic seven-footer, Lochner alters even the shots that it cannot block.
An irony bears mention. Lochner’s anticanonicity, its stickiness as a
negative precedent, both motivates and derives from its usefulness
across the ideological and doctrinal spectrum. Lochner became anticanonical in the late 1960s and early 1970s, not because advocates
and judges suddenly discovered that economic due process was a losing claim but rather because they discovered that noneconomic due
117
process was a winning one. Lochner is an instrument of opposition,
not affirmative argumentation, and so its effectiveness has expanded
118
in proportion to the numerosity of its potential targets. Griswold
and its progeny provided conservatives with reason to invoke Lochner
as a negative precedent, and liberals, who had long embraced antiLochner rhetoric, continued to do so as a means of distinguishing
119
progressive due process arguments from conservative ones. And so
it is the conceptual generativity of due process arguments that engenders Lochner’s anticanonicity. Lochner revisionism, rampant within
120
the legal academy and at conservative think tanks, may be better
described as a feature of Lochner’s anticanonical status than as a
threat to it.
It remains to explain why Lochner does not effectively condemn
federalism arguments—the other claims the New Deal settlement was
121
thought to have settled—even as many seek to call it to that service.
The answer may be, in part, that Griswold, and later Roe, have helped
to fix the socio-legal meaning of Lochner as a case about economic
117
118
119
120
121
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due process and unenumerated rights rather than as a full-fledged
stand-in for limitations on governmental regulatory authority. Abortion rights cases give liberals strong reason to defend substantive due
process and therefore give conservatives strong reason to attack it.
Economic due process gives some conservatives strong reason to defend substantive due process and so gives liberals strong reason to attack it. By contrast, one finds strong critics of broad congressional
power almost exclusively on the political right, and so states’ rights
arguments are not universally deployed. Federalism has not found its
Lochner because it has not found its Roe.
CONCLUSION
The force of the broccoli objection derives from its self-evident
incompatability with liberal democratic premises. And yet the logic
of the ACA challengers’ principal argument would suggest no constitutional infirmity in a state-level mandate to purchase (and consume?) broccoli. There is no conceptual incongruity in the notion
that we have rights that only states, and not the federal government,
122
123
may infringe. The right to a grand jury and to a civil jury trial are
124
among those rights, and we get along fine with that tension. Moreover, the idea that the federal structure is not concerned with limitations on centralized power for its own sake but rather for the sake of
rights protection has a lengthy and distinguished intellectual histo125
ry.
But there is little reason in principle to suppose that among the
rights less protected as against states than as against the federal government is the right to refuse participation in an interstate commercial market. And if such a right is among those the federal govern122
123
124
125
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ment has less leeway to infringe, then surely the reason for that is
grounded not in limitations inherent in Article I, but in independent
limitations housed within the Bill of Rights. Putting principle aside,
there is still less justification in pre-ACA doctrine for the suggestion
that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper
Clause permits regulation of self-insurance for medical costs but that
the Fifth Amendment has nothing to say about the matter.
The most persuasive explanation for this confusing mix of propositions rests neither in principle nor in doctrine, but rather in party
politics and in our socio-legal culture. A substantive due process attack on the individual mandate would threaten Mitt Romney’s political prospects and Republican Party unity, would associate conservatives with reproductive freedom precedents, and perhaps as
significantly, would place Lochner, rather than broccoli, at the center
of the legal argument. Yuck.
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